DOCUMENTATION · v0.12.2

Commerce and payments

Status: boundary decision and proposed integration plan. No real payment operations, mandate minting or provider integrations exist. An additive deny-by-default boundary helper ships as the optional ./commerce-boundary subpath; it contains no purchase logic. No real purchases, payment submissions or financial account operations are permitted during development or testing. Research date: 2026-11-19.

1. Hard rule#

Generic tool permissions must never grant authority to make a purchase, transfer money, or sign a payment mandate.

tools.invoke in AI Auth means "a tool may run after scope and approval checks". It says nothing about spending. A capability grant, membership or execution grant is not a payment credential. This rule is non-negotiable and overrides any convenience argument.

2. Responsibilities#

SystemResponsibilityAI Auth relationship
UCPCheckout, identity linking, order webhooks, payment token exchange, capability negotiationSeparate commerce layer; may use an AI Auth identity claim if a verifier accepts it
AP2Verifiable Digital Credentials as checkout and payment mandates; verifiable intent, not inferred actionSeparate payment layer; AI Auth does not mint mandates from generic grants
UCP AP2 mandates extensionPlaces mandates in UCP checkout and binds them to a specific sessionOptional integration; "security locked" sessions cannot fall back
AI AuthPortable identity, consent, scoped authority, revocation, auditSupplies identity and proof primitives only

3. UCP findings#

From primary sources:

  • Active specification with dated releases; examples use 2026-08-25. Apache-2.0.
  • Capabilities: checkout (cart, tax, human-in-the-loop or autonomous), identity linking (OAuth 2.0), order (webhooks), payment token exchange. Extensions cover fulfillment, discounts, buyer consent, AP2 mandates, 3DS, terms and split payments.
  • Discovery: business profile at /.well-known/ucp, platform profile via UCP-Agent, capability intersection negotiation. Reverse-domain namespace dev.ucp.*.
  • Transports: REST, MCP, A2A, embedded; transport agnostic.
  • Keys: RFC 7517 JWK Set; EC P-256/P-384 (ES256/ES384) and OKP Ed25519 (EdDSA); kid is the RFC 7638 SHA-256 thumbprint; JCS (RFC 8785) for durable signatures.
  • Security model is a "trust triangle" with transaction integrity and non-repudiation. Scenario C is the autonomous agent with AP2.

4. AP2 findings#

From primary sources:

  • v0.1.0 (16 Sep 2025), v0.2.0 (28 Apr 2026). Pre-1.0 and evolving. Apache-2.0.
  • Standardization continues in FIDO Alliance agentic authentication and payments working groups.
  • Core idea: Verifiable Digital Credentials as cryptographic mandates, "verifiable intent, not inferred action", non-repudiable audit trail.
  • Checkout Mandate: Open (pre-cart constraints) and Closed (finalized checkout). Payment Mandate: Open (budget/instrument constraints) and Closed (amount bound to final checkout).
  • Available as extensions for A2A and UCP.
  • Known caveat: AP2 v0.2 is internally inconsistent on the signature algorithm rule (AP2 issue #268). Treat as evolving.

5. UCP AP2 mandates extension#

From ucp.dev/latest/specification/payment/extensions/ap2-mandates/:

  • Capability dev.ucp.common.payment.ap2_mandate extends dev.ucp.shopping.checkout.
  • Once negotiated, the session is "security locked" and cannot fall back to unprotected checkout.
  • Business signs checkout terms as a detached JWS (RFC 7515 Appendix F) with alg and kid; payload is JCS-canonicalized checkout minus ap2.
  • Platform produces a checkout mandate (SD-JWT with key binding) and a payment mandate token.
  • Consent models: trusted platform provider with explicit user consent, or digital payment credential presented via OpenID4VP with wallet signing.
  • Verification: business verifies signature, key binding, expiry, embedded checkout, merchant authorization and terms match; PSP verifies the payment mandate. Errors include mandate_required, mandate_invalid_signature, mandate_expired, mandate_scope_mismatch.

Division of labor: UCP specifies where mandates live and how they bind to checkout; AP2 specifies the mandate credential structure.

6. Proposed integration boundary#

ItemDecision
AI Auth identity used as a verifiable agent identity in UCPOptional; only if UCP verifiers accept the claim format. No new credential format.
Key reuseAlign signing keys with ES256/Ed25519 and RFC 7638 kid, already consistent with AI Auth's P-256 identity.
Payment authority from tools.invokeReject outright.
Payment authority from a capability grantReject outright.
Spending constraintsMust be transaction-bound mandates with amount, instrument, expiry and explicit human consent as required by AP2/UCP.
Integration modeSeparate optional package, mocks and provider sandboxes only.
Real financial operationsNot permitted in development or testing.
Core SDK changesNone. No website-specific or merchant-specific logic enters the core SDK.

7. Acceptance criteria#

  • UCP commerce workflows remain separate from the unified tool registry.
  • AP2 mandates are verified according to their own specification, not by AI Auth grant verification.
  • Payment authorization is bound to a specific transaction and constraints.
  • A test asserts that a wallet holding tools.invoke cannot produce a valid purchase or payment mandate.
  • No real payment credentials or accounts are used in any test.
  • Secrets never appear in logs, room events or audit records.
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